

Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative

Final Synthesis Report
Volume 5 – Appendices VI–VIII

APPENDIX VIII:
ADDRESSING THE TOR'S HIGH LEVEL QUESTIONS

February 2010



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¹ What was originally Annex E was later redesignated as Appendix VIII. Similarly Appendix VII was formerly designated Annex I. To minimise confusion, remaining annexes have kept their original letters.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CD	Capacity Development
CF	Catalytic Fund
CRS	Creditor Reporting System (OECD DAC)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Country Status Report
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DPO	Development Policy Operations
EFA	Education for All
EPDF	Education Program Development Fund
ESP	Education Sector Plan
FS	Fragile State
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HLQ	High Level Question
HQ	Head quarters
IF	Indicative Framework
LDG	Local Donor Group
LEG	Local Education Group
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
PD	Paris Declaration
PDD	Pôle de Dakar
SBS	Sector Budget Support
OPR	Preliminary Report
SBSiP	Sector Budget Support in Practice
SR	Synthesis Report
TF	Task Force
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UPC	Universal Primary Completion
WB	World Bank

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Appendix VIII – Addressing the TOR's High Level Questions

Introduction

The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation included a set of high level questions (HLQs) which the evaluation was required to address.² This Appendix demonstrates that all the HLQs (including their subquestions) have been addressed and shows how this has been done.

This Appendix is not intended to be a self-contained summary of the evaluation's findings (for which, see the Executive Summary in the first volume of this report). While it briefly gives the gist of the evaluation's answers to each of the HLQs, its main purpose is to show where the full, and fully nuanced, answers to each HLQ or subquestion can be found. It also indicates the evidence base on which the evaluation has drawn for each question, and notes any particular issues concerning the availability and utility of evidence. The evaluation's reports systematically explain the data limitations that have been taken into account in drawing – or refraining from drawing – inferences from the data available.

Since this is a formative evaluation, there is particular attention to the potential improvements in the FTI that the evaluation has identified.

² The full TOR are included in Appendix V (Note on Approach and Methods).

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>High Level Questions 1: Is what FTI aims to accomplish consistent with current needs and priorities of FTI client countries?</p>	<p>The evaluation concludes that the FTI's aims remain relevant. However:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • there has not been sufficient agreement about the aims and how progress should be measured (see Chapter 3F, Annex F, Appendix VI); • there has been a gap between aims and effect (see responses to HLQs 2 below); • the definition of client countries has changed (not – any longer – just the invited countries, nor the endorsed countries, but all the eligible countries) cf. HLQ2b below; • the issue of how broad FTI's aims should be is not resolved (cf. Chapter 4, Conclusion 7 and Conclusion 8). <p>At country level the FTI has not always done the most relevant things (a point which emerges particularly in discussion of aid effectiveness.)</p>	<p>SR Chapter 3B summarises why an FTI is still needed. See also Chapter 4, Conclusion 1.</p> <p>PR Chapter 4 includes extensive discussion of different stakeholder perspectives.</p> <p>Questions of relevance are systematically addressed in each of the country studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: Extensive interviews at global and country level (see Annex J). Documentary review in FTI archives and more generally (extended bibliography in Volume 2 of the SR and individual bibliographies for country studies). Data review (exemplified in Appendix I). [This is the general evidence base for HLQ1; notes against sub-questions below are supplementary.]</i></p>
<p>What can be done to ensure the relevance of FTI going forward?</p>	<p>The evaluation provides recommendations about both relevance and effectiveness. (Relevance is compromised if the initiative is not also effective – see the effectiveness issues raised under HLQs 2 and 3 below.)</p> <p>Highlights from the recommendations on relevance include:</p> <p><i>The scope and configuration of the partnership's activities</i></p> <p>S74 <i>Which education goals?</i> ... There is a strong case for more explicitly expanding the FTI's focus beyond UPC, but there will be little benefit in doing so unless the financial implications are factored in. In particular, it would be counterproductive to expand the focus of the Catalytic Fund unless there is a commensurate increase in its resources.</p> <p>S75 <i>What types of support?</i> Support provided through the FTI should be both financial and technical, and support for capacity development should not be separate from other financial support; i.e. the EPDF component should in future be much more closely integrated with the CF component. Funds for capacity development – whether for "endorsement" or for programme implementation – should be continuous, predictable, and probably even more long-term than funds for other purposes. ...</p> <p>Detailed recommendations for the future configuration of the FTI (e.g. shift to a paradigm based on the Progressive Framework) simultaneously address relevance and effectiveness.</p>	<p>SR Chapter 5 for recommendations.</p> <p>More detailed analysis on the need for reform of the EPDF and CF in Appendix IV, Appendix VII.</p> <p>Relevance beyond UPC and to different client countries is addressed in SR Chapter 3.</p> <p>On relevance to fragile states, see Annex H.</p> <p>On relevance to large and federal states, see: SR Chapter 3, ¶3.212–3.214, and the country studies for Nigeria, Pakistan, Ethiopia.</p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>a. How is the FTI perceived and understood by various stakeholders and to what extent have varying interpretations of what FTI is and what it can accomplish influenced its effectiveness in any way?</p>	<p>The FTI has been hampered by its stakeholders' differing interpretations of its appropriate role, ambitions and activities. As noted in the Executive Summary:</p> <p>S55 The tensions surrounding the FTI's initial launch and design have persisted, and the FTI has continually had to balance forces pulling it in different directions. There have been tensions between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) The pilot approach to prove the effectiveness of the good practices embodied in the Indicative Framework, versus a more inclusive and ambitious approach which placed more emphasis on achieving the MDGs and EFA goals, thus seeking to recruit more countries more rapidly into the partnership. (b) "Needs"-based versus "performance"-based support – i.e. should support go to those countries that are in greatest need, or to those that have demonstrated that they meet key conditions which will allow them to meet their EFA goals? This issue has come to the fore in the FTI's discussion of how to deal with "fragile states" (with concern expressed on some fronts about the risk of devaluing the FTI's "gold standard" of ESP endorsement). (c) Addressing the "finance gap" versus other gaps (capacity, planning, monitoring and evaluation, etc.), and hence the extent to which the FTI should be judged by its achievements in resource mobilisation. (d) Specific targets relating to primary education versus wider objectives of supporting EFA and education sector planning as a whole. <p>S56 The tensions inherent within the FTI come particularly from the different agendas and aspirations of the various donor partners involved. The FTI has had to move forward cautiously in order to keep a broad donor coalition together. Especially because of the quest for consensus decisions, this has often resulted in long negotiations marring the FTI's operational effectiveness and diluting some of the FTI's original intentions.</p> <p>The evaluation notes that the FTI has failed thus far to resolve important conflicts of interest, including those related to the many roles played by the World Bank.</p>	<p>Stakeholder perspectives were discussed extensively in the PR Chapter 4. They are also incorporated in the country studies. Within the Synthesis Report, differing stakeholder perspectives are extensively treated in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SR Chapter 2 (Origins, Objective and Evolution of the FTI). • Annex B – evolution of governance and related debates within the partnership, roles of key actors including the World Bank, comparisons with other global partnerships. • SR Exhibit 14 and Annex C chart the differing interpretations and usage of the Indicative Framework. • Annex H – the debate over fragile states. • Annex K – concepts and practice relating to "financing gaps". • SR Chapter 3D, discussion of perspectives on (the criteria for) endorsement of ESPs and CF applications (cf. ¶3.98–3.99) • SR Chapter 3D and Annex F note concerns related to learning outcomes. <p><i>Evidence base: Extensive interviews at global and country level (see Annex J). Documentary review in FTI archives and more generally. Country case studies. Observation of FTI meetings. (The EOC was itself a revealing microcosm of the tensions and contradictions that pervade the partnership.)</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>b. To what extent is FTI's focus on primary school completion relevant to the current needs of partner countries (and potential partner countries) and how has this emphasis been treated within the broader context of country EFA programming?</p>	<p>Achieving primary school completion remains a valid objective. In addition, it has been useful in attracting political attention and facilitating consensus at global level.</p> <p>There is a strong case for more explicitly expanding the FTI's focus beyond UPC, with careful consideration of the financial and process implications. Special importance attaches to youth /adult education needs in the context of fragile/conflict states.</p> <p>Thus:</p> <p>S67 Highlighting the importance of primary education (as the MDGs did) was a simple way of galvanising support. In practice, the FTI's scope has been broader, but there are unresolved issues about reconciling a sector-wide plan with a primary education specific concentration of support and about achieving an appropriate balance amongst all the EFA objectives.</p> <p>S68 The evaluation's case studies did not find evidence that the FTI was actually diverting resources from other EFA objectives. (In some cases there was direct FTI support to other components of EFA, or broad support to a sector programme that extended beyond primary.) However, there is a case that other EFA goals (such as adult literacy) have tended to be neglected by governments and donors alike, and that the FTI has not challenged this. A narrow focus on primary education may be less appropriate in the context of fragile states (where secondary education and adult learning may have an important role in addressing causes of fragility). And the more success there is in expanding primary education, the greater the pressure on other levels of the education system (as manifested in the increased political attention to secondary education in several of the case study countries). However, discussions within the FTI about expanding its scope have not adequately addressed the resource implications of doing so.</p>	<p>See SR Chapter 3B, Chapter 4 (Conclusion 1, Conclusion 8)</p> <p>For more on the niceties of UPC as an indicator, see Annex C. On relevance to fragile states, see Annex H.</p> <p>On the scope of FTI and CF support in practice see Chapter 3D (e.g. ¶3.105, ¶3.113) and country studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: analysis of global data, country case studies, interviews, document review.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>c. Are FTI's intended contributions appropriate, given the partnership's objectives? Can they be expected to make a difference?</p>	<p>There is not unanimity about what the FTI's intentions (hence intended contributions) are (cf. the responses to HLQ1b above), and FTI design has evolved over time.</p> <p>The evaluation found gaps between how the FTI was expected to operate and how it has operated in practice. Some intended contributions have not consistently been delivered (notably the donor side of the "FTI compact" at country level). The evaluation found a number of significant elements of the FTI design where the intentions were laudable but actual delivery of contributions was not on a sufficient scale to make the degree of difference sought by the FTI's advocates.</p> <p>The evaluation's overall analysis of the gap between intentions and achievement is provided in SR Chapter 4, and hinges on the insufficient attention that was paid to the incentives and constraints of various stakeholders and to key issues in communication and monitoring.</p>	<p>Evolution of FTI design is charted in SR Chapter 2.</p> <p>The balance of strengths and weaknesses in the design of the FTI is assessed in Chapter 4. Design strengths are noted under Conclusions 1 and 4 (¶4.4–4.6, ¶4.11), while the design weaknesses are noted under Conclusion 5 (¶4.11), where weaknesses in implementation are also noted (¶4.12).</p> <p>For overall analysis see SR Chapter 4, ¶4.19–4.24.</p> <p>The summaries in Chapter 4 draw on the detailed workstream-wise analyses in Chapter 3 of the SR, in the annexes and appendices that are linked to the workstream analysis, and, not least, on the country case studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country case studies, interviews, analysis of global aid trends, analysis of FTI monitoring and reporting frameworks, documents and literature review; comparison with other global partnerships.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>d. How has the evolution of the FTI contributed to maintaining its ongoing relevance as a global partnership supporting EFA?</p>	<p>The evaluation notes the adaptability of the FTI and counts this among its strengths:</p> <p>S51 The FTI nevertheless has important strengths. These include the strong involvement of a broad coalition of OECD DAC donors (though the number of donors providing significant financial support for its activities remains very limited) as well as its willingness to learn from experience, to be self-critical and to adapt.</p> <p>S52 In the area of governance in particular, the FTI has shown willingness and commitment to reform. Progress has been made in strengthening the FTI's governance both at global and country levels. Many (though not all) of the issues highlighted in the first external review of the FTI in 2005 have been reflected in subsequent governance changes. The FTI today includes better representation of its various constituencies in decision-making, its governance structures have been streamlined, the dominant role of the WB has been somewhat modified, and country processes have been clarified.</p> <p>S53 Many of the FTI's original design principles and insights remain pertinent. These include: the principle of country ownership; the importance of coherent sector policies and plans; the need to address the dimensions of policy, data and capacity as well as finance; the need for more effective aid and the recognition that business as usual will not suffice –education especially needs more predictable aid, often extending to the funding of recurrent costs; the need for more relevant and efficient modalities, while education plans and budgets need to be linked to national level – hence the importance of linking ESPs with overall poverty reduction strategies; the concept of partnership and of results-focused reciprocal commitments between governments and donors (the "compact").</p> <p>But see also the tensions cited against HLQ2b above which have hampered the FTI's adaptation. As a result</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The process for delivering change has been ad hoc and slow. • There has been a lack of strategic analysis of gaps and of the impact of potential changes in the medium term. • The FTI remains more a donor club than a balanced partnership. <p>Constant changes and unclear links between global and country levels have led to misunderstandings, frustration, additional transactions costs thus lower effectiveness than potentially feasible/expected. (This is acknowledged in the FTI's own efforts to clarify country-level processes, aid modality guidelines and governance.)</p>	<p>The evolution of the FTI as a partnership is charted in SR Chapter 2, with more detailed coverage in Annex B. Conclusions about the FTI's ongoing relevance, and analysis of the dynamics of change and what makes for more or less effective adaptations are provided in SR Chapter 4 and Annex B. Annex H serves, inter alia, as a case study in how the FTI has managed the process of reform and innovation. The case studies provide copious evidence of how the evolving FTI has been experienced at country level at different times and places.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country studies, interviews, analysis of other global partnerships, analysis of task team outputs and other FTI documentation.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>High Level Questions 2: To what extent is the FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, namely, accelerating progress on EFA?</p>	<p>The evaluation found that the FTI's contributions have fallen short of its ambitions and of its reasonable expectations. The FTI has made some significant tangible and intangible contributions to promoting EFA, both globally and in some particular countries, but the evaluation found little evidence that the FTI has <i>accelerated</i> progress towards EFA.</p> <p>Findings are summarised in the SR's Conclusions 2 and 3. The positive contributions are listed as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Its role as an important, inclusive global forum, especially for donors. • Its role in helping to keep UPC and EFA on the international agenda. • Reinforcing the focus of education donors on supporting country-owned plans and processes. • Promoting the aid effectiveness agenda. • The Catalytic Fund's role as an additional channel of support for basic education, which has made substantial tangible contributions towards UPC and EFA in the recipient countries;. • Technical support through the EPDF. <p>On the other hand:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With respect to resource mobilisation, the results have been disappointing, globally and in most countries. • In addition to an impact on financing, the FTI expected to address other important "gaps" by promoting stronger policy and planning processes, strengthening capacity, and promoting data collection and monitoring and evaluation. While the FTI has made some contributions to these areas, the evaluation found that overall its added value has been considerably less than expected. <p>The points are elaborated against the more detailed sub-questions below.</p>	<p>The SR provides, in Chapter 3, a workstream by workstream review of what the FTI inputs have actually been, globally and at country level, and of what contributions they have made towards progress on EFA. The findings are summarised in SR Chapter 4. Supporting evidence and analysis is provided in more detail in the country case studies (each of which includes an analytical summary matrix) and in the various annexes and appendices. (Links between particular annexes/appendices and various HLQ2 subquestions are charted against the subquestions below.)</p> <p><i>Evidence Base: The FTI has displayed a serious weakness in its tendency to rely on simplistic comparisons between endorsed and un-endorsed countries as evidence of the FTI's success. As the SR notes (¶S28):</i></p> <p><i>On available education indicators since 1999, the countries endorsed by the FTI have tended to perform better than the eligible countries that are not yet endorsed [the relevant data are highlighted in SR Chapter 3B, and in Appendix I]. Since (a) the FTI selects better performers, (b) FTI inputs are in most cases a small part of overall inputs, and (c) many endorsements are very recent, this cannot be taken as proof of the FTI's effectiveness. The evaluation's overall conclusions are based on a careful review of global data and the country case studies.</i></p> <p>See also the Technical Note appended to the main report.</p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>Are FTI mechanisms and processes contributing effectively to this?</p>	<p>The evaluation found that limits in the FTI's effectiveness in accelerating progress towards EFA are linked to some significant flaws in the design and the implementation of the FTI's mechanisms and processes; these are spelled out in the SR Chapter 4.</p> <p>Since this is a formative evaluation geared towards strengthening the FTI going forward, it naturally focuses on areas in which the FTI might be improved. In doing so, it takes note of the strong points in its existing design, and of positive steps that have already been taken.</p> <p><i>Key findings by workstream were as follows:</i></p> <p><u>Planning:</u> Too much weight and expectation were given to the Indicative Framework and the ESP as a product.</p> <p>Unrealistic expectations concerning the capacity and ability of the in-country donor groups particularly in terms of mobilising new resources and impartially assessing ESPs.</p> <p><u>Financing and Aid Effectiveness:</u> Confusion around the concept and use of financing gaps, and an allocation pattern that is not transparently linked to needs, capacity or FTI objectives.</p> <p>Mismatch between objectives in terms of aid effectiveness and actual implementation modalities. The FTI has not developed mechanisms that address problems of <i>long term</i> financing.</p> <p><u>Capacity Development:</u> In practice, the focus has been too much on the ESP and not sufficiently upon implementation and service delivery, with globally understood concepts of capacity development not yet sufficiently communicated or catalysed at country level.</p> <p><u>Monitoring and Evaluation:</u> The FTI has not had a clear and operational monitoring and evaluation strategy.</p> <p>FTI monitoring and decision making has suffered by lacking a monitoring function that is properly resourced and independent.</p> <p><u>Governance and management:</u> Ad-hocery of FTI reform process (Task Teams), 'light touch' Secretariat hampering adequate communication and monitoring functions.</p> <p>Weaknesses in links between donor agency HQs with their in-country staff.</p> <p><i>More detail is provided against the respective subquestions that follow.</i></p>	<p>SR Chapter 2 provides an overview of FTI mechanisms and processes and how they have developed; SR Chapter 3 reviews the operation of FTI mechanisms and processes against each workstream. The country case studies provided detailed documentation and assessment of FTI mechanisms and processes as they have operated at country level. SR Chapter 4 draws these threads together in the evaluation's overall conclusions.</p> <p>On processes and mechanisms related to policy and planning, see especially SR Chapter 3D; also Annex C on the Indicative Framework, Annex H on fragile states, Annex K on financing gaps.</p> <p>In relation to financing and aid effectiveness, see SR Chapter 3C and 3G and Appendices II and III (education financing generally and via the Catalytic Fund); Annex K on financing gaps is again relevant.</p> <p>In relation to capacity development, see SR Chapter 3E, Annex G and Appendix IV.</p> <p>In relation to monitoring and evaluation, see SR Chapter 3F, Annex F and Appendix VI.</p> <p>In relation to governance and management, see SR Chapters 2 and 4 and Annex B; Annex K, inter alia, serves as a case study in FTI governance and management as it has related to fragile states.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country studies, interviews, analysis of FTI and related documentation, observation of FTI meetings, analysis of other global partnerships, analysis of global aid data and CF disbursements.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>How can FTI mechanisms and processes be improved to maximize their contributions going forward?</p>	<p>The evaluation's recommendations for strengthening the FTI as a partnership,, the Secretariat that supports it, and the processes through which it operates are set out in SR Chapter 5 (with some elaborated in Appendices).</p>	<p>Synthesis report Chapter 5 (recommendations and future options) Appendix VI (M&E framework) Appendix VII (Reforming the Catalytic Fund) <i>Evidence base: interviews, country studies, document review, and analysis of other global partnerships.</i></p>
<p>a. To what extent has FTI and its mechanisms/ processes (e.g. Indicative Framework and the endorsement process) helped countries strengthen education policies, sector plans, and educational data/statistics?</p>	<p>The evaluation found in respect to both the sub-issues raised here, that there were positive elements in FTI's performance but also substantial shortcomings that would need to be addressed in order to meet the FTI's objectives. The report includes analysis of the reasons for the shortcomings identified. <u>As regards education policies and sector plans, the SR notes:</u></p> <p>S41 On policy and planning. This is an area where the FTI has sought to play a key role. However, most of the policy and planning emphasis has been on the endorsement process, with far less attention given to the subsequent monitoring and review of implementation at country level. The Indicative Framework has not been the central feature of endorsed ESPs that was anticipated. In several countries, the IF was interpreted as an instrument of conditionality; in others it was used – more in line with FTI guidelines – to inform dialogue; and in some it was not used at all. Its use as a framework for monitoring country performance has been very limited.</p> <p>S42 The guidelines for appraisal and endorsement have tended to keep the donors in the forefront of the action, and much responsibility has been placed upon the activities of the LDG and especially the lead donor ("coordinating agency"). The participation of in-country stakeholders has been very variable, and the evaluation found that there are serious issues related to the capacity of both LEGs and LDGs. Changes in donor staffing policies and practices have tended to reduce the capacity of in-country donor groups. Most engagement by LDGs has been during the process of plan preparation (or adaptation) and endorsement, and has tended to diminish once approvals and funding have been granted. There is still much scope for improvement in the part played by key civil society actors and by parliaments.</p> <p><u>As regards educational data and statistics, the SR notes (¶S45–S47):</u></p> <p>S45 On data, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The FTI's agenda included promoting cross-country performance measures, in particular through the IF and with a specific focus on the Primary Completion Rate (PCR). There has been more attention to UPC data, but reporting on IF indicators in general has not improved significantly. At global level there continue to be key data weaknesses (e.g. in the enumeration of out-of-school children, and in data on public expenditure for education) where the FTI could have advocated for improvements. Only a small portion of CF grants has been used in some countries for activities to strengthen data reporting and use. The EPDF supported numerous activities to increase data coverage and use, but overall its activities appear fragmented given the bigger data gap issues.</p>	<p>On education policies and sector plans see SR Chapter 3D and the country case studies; also Annex C on the Indicative Framework, Annex K on fragile states. Experiences of individual case study countries are fully documented in each case study.</p> <p>On educational data/statistics, and their use, see SR Chapter 3F, Annex F, Appendix I (which includes commentary on the quality of data), Annex C on the use of the IF and the UPC indicator, Appendix IV on the role of the EPDF, plus the country case studies.</p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
	<p>S46 The envisaged strengthening of ESPs at country level to include monitoring and evaluation and annual targets for measuring progress has only partially taken place. Moreover, evidence from the country case studies shows that progress in using data for planning has remained limited, that the FTI's contribution to such progress has been minor, and that too often donors themselves remain the principal audience for any analyses of the data.</p> <p>S47 The anticipated monitoring by the FTI Secretariat of the country-level performance of all partners has been very weak. Countries themselves have not systematically set and reported against targets based on the IF, and donors have not made monitorable commitments about their own performance.</p>	<p><i>Evidence base: FTI documentation and related literature; country studies, interviews, available data at global and country level.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>b. Are FTI mechanisms and processes evolving appropriately to address the needs of different client countries (e.g. fragile states)?</p>	<p>The Preliminary Report noted Three issues stand out under this heading [addressing the needs of different client countries]: the tension between performance-based and needs-based approaches; the challenge of being relevant to large states; and (cutting across both previous issues) the challenges of supporting education in fragile states. (PR ¶4.47)</p> <p>On the tension between needs-based and performance-based approaches, the evaluation notes that the initial emphasis on a performance-based approach was soon modified as the FTI was made accessible to a wider group of countries. However there have been continuing inconsistencies: the "gold standard" of endorsement linked to "credible plans" continued to influence the thinking of FTI donors, although in practice the use of the Indicative Framework as a reference was rather limited, and donor groups' decisions on endorsement were pragmatic, and therefore not necessarily consistent across countries.</p> <p>On fragile states in particular, the evaluation charts the efforts of the FTI to address this category, including the development (but not yet the implementation) of a "Progressive Framework" which represents a different paradigm, based on continuing support adapted to circumstances, rather than a one-off entry threshold for substantial financial support through the FTI. The evaluation concludes that the latter paradigm is much more relevant to the needs of client countries, and this view underlies the recommendation that the FTI should be reformed around a single, flexible process which all potential client countries could follow.</p> <p>On large (and federal) states, the evaluation notes that, thus far, the FTI (and its Secretariat) has not had the capacity to address the particular issues these countries face. Several have benefited from EPDF activities, but none has been endorsed or accessed the Catalytic Fund. Many of the assumptions underlying the core FTI "design" do not apply in large federal states (e.g. a single national plan for basic education, active and effective donor groups at the levels of government that are most important in the planning and delivery of basic education service, etc). The FTI design would therefore need significant – and country-specific – adaptations before the FTI could engage effectively with these states.</p>	<p>Many sections of the report are relevant to the question of balancing needs-based and performance-based approaches. The original FTI design is explained in Chapter 2; its implementation in practice is discussed workstream by workstream in Chapter 3, leading to conclusions and recommendations in Chapters 4 and 5. Annex C (Indicative Framework), Appendix II (Catalytic Fund) and Annex K (financing gaps) are especially relevant in charting and assessing the evolution of relevant mechanisms.</p> <p>Special issues relating to fragile states are summarised in SR Chapter 3D and thoroughly dealt with in Annex H.</p> <p>The SR discussion of the FTI in relation to large/federal states draws particularly on the country studies for Nigeria, Pakistan and Ethiopia.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country case studies, interviews, document review, data on allocation of FTI resources. The analysis on fragile states is supported by a substantial working paper and literature review on the subject (Dom 2009a and Dom 2009b).</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>c. Has policy making and planning become more open, transparent, and participatory in participating countries?</p>	<p><i>[Note: we interpret this question as, like the others, addressing FTI effects on these factors]</i></p> <p>Overall, the quality of education planning has improved. EFA and the FTI have made some contributions to this, especially in helping to get donors to work together and to focus on the national ESP. FTI and CF processes have in general been aligned with existing sector coordination and dialogue processes in country, but the FTI has not been the main source of improvements.</p> <p>In a limited number of cases, FTI processes have contributed to broadening stakeholder participation, in some others FTI-related processes have bypassed existing stakeholder consultation mechanisms.</p>	<p>Synthesis report Chapter 3D. Country case studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country case studies, interviews, document and literature review.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>d. To what extent has FTI contributed to improved institutional capacity in partner countries (including those preparing for partnership); has the capacity building provided been sufficiently comprehensive to make a sustainable difference?</p>	<p>The FTI contribution to capacity development has been very limited, mainly through EPDF and CF funding but only in some countries. Overall, FTI support to capacity development has not been sufficient, or sufficiently comprehensive, to make a sustainable difference. As summed up in the SR:</p> <p>S44 On capacity development. The FTI's perspective on capacity has moved forward from the original depiction of "capacity gaps" to the more holistic approach that is now reflected in the FTI's capacity <i>development</i> guidelines – but these are recent and have yet to be widely used at country level. Most countries continue to lack comprehensive capacity development approaches, and the FTI has not significantly contributed to increasing their prevalence or strengthening country ownership of capacity development support. The FTI's own direct contributions to capacity development have tended to be piecemeal through support to selected short-term activities. A lack of awareness of the EPDF outside the WB has meant that the opportunity for widespread engagement in the use of the EPDF to build capacity has been missed. In practice, the FTI has focused mainly on upstream assistance with plan preparation, and paid insufficient attention to the continuing needs for capacity development during implementation.</p>	<p>Synthesis report Chapter 3E, Annex G (FTI and capacity development) and Appendix IV (EPDF).</p> <p>Also addressed in each of the country case studies, with summary in the standard analytical matrix.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: interviews, country case studies, literature review, analysis of FTI and EPDF reports.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>e. To what extent and how has FTI contributed to accelerated progress towards universal primary school completion by 2015?</p>	<p>It is inherently much more difficult to gauge the extent of any FTI contribution than it is to identify how (through which channels of influence) the FTI has contributed. The FTI objective of accelerating progress towards UPC is a demanding one. And the FTI cannot reasonably be credited with incremental improvements in outcomes unless incremental FTI inputs are identified.</p>	<p>The channels of influence through which the FTI might operate are discussed in Chapter 2 (for the overall design) and in each workstream analysis (Chapter 3) of the SR. They are systematically depicted in the Evaluation Framework (see Appendix V on the approach and methods for the evaluation).</p>
<p>f. How have FTI programs contributed to intermediate outcomes such as improvements in the grade 1 intake and gross enrolment ratios</p>	<p>The evaluation approached this by seeking to identify the different inputs (intangible as well as tangible) provided by the FTI, globally and at country level, assessing the extent to which they were incremental, and judging the scale of FTI influence accordingly. Each workstream analysis identifies the channels through which the FTI may have exerted influence and seeks to identify specific inputs that may be wholly or partly due to the FTI.</p> <p>In general, FTI inputs were not well documented and had not been well monitored by the FTI. While there are obviously records on allocations and disbursements of funds through the CF and EPDF, contributions through the regular programmes of FTI donor partners were not systematically recorded either ex ante (as commitments) or ex post (as disbursements).</p> <p>At the Preliminary Report stage, the evaluation team explored the possibility of drawing inferences from the performance of early-endorsed countries as a group vs. those endorsed later. It concluded (and stakeholders concurred) that neither the data available, nor the nature of the case (e.g. the short period of FTI influence and the deliberate bias in the selection of countries) would allow robust statistical inferences to be drawn. (See Preliminary Report, Annex E.)</p> <p>At the global level, the evaluation has been unable to demonstrate that the FTI has led to the result its founders expected – a level of resources in support of EFA that is substantially higher than would otherwise have occurred. Through the CF, the FTI has provided a channel to absorb additional support to EFA from some donors, but there has not been a clear step-increase in overall external support to basic education, while the increase in support for EFA from domestic financing cannot be attributed to the FTI.</p> <p>The evaluation's overall conclusion is that the contribution of the FTI has been modest. This does not mean that funds disbursed through the CF have been wasted. They have been used in support of EFA goals, including increases in enrolments, but the catalytic effects have been small and the design and implementation has not ensured that these inputs are necessarily additional; nor has the aspect of sustainability been satisfactorily addressed. (These points are taken up in the evaluation's detailed recommendations.)</p> <p>At the same time, there are positive lessons from some countries (in particular where CF provides large amounts of financing, provided in a harmonised and aligned manner – Rwanda and Kenya are the most prominent examples amongst the case studies)..</p>	<p>Financial inputs (domestic and external) are reviewed in detail in Appendix II and Appendix III. Background educational data for the evaluation period are presented in Appendix I, which also comments on data quality.</p> <p>Similar analyses at country level are reported in the country case studies. The evaluation has considered indirect as well as direct effects (e.g. in its exploration of possible catalytic effects – see SR Box 4).</p> <p><i>Evidence base: Global and country level data on progress towards EFA and UPC. Global and country level data on aid flows. FTI records on CF and EPDF. Country case studies. Interviews. Literature review. (In all cases where the evaluation has drawn – or refrained from drawing – inferences from the data available, it has explained the data limitations that have been taken into account.)</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>g. Has FTI itself supported other EFA objectives in partner countries and, if so, to what effect?</p> <p>h. How has the FTI impacted government support for other EFA objectives?</p>	<p>The evaluation's findings on these points are summarised as follows:</p> <p>Conclusion 8 On the balance between UPC and other EFA targets, FTI's "offering" has become increasingly broad over time. There are good reasons for this, but the FTI has not yet properly addressed the strategic implications.</p> <p>S67 Highlighting the importance of primary education (as the MDGs did) was a simple way of galvanising support. In practice, the FTI's scope has been broader, but there are unresolved issues about reconciling a sector-wide plan with a primary education specific concentration of support and about achieving an appropriate balance amongst all the EFA objectives.</p> <p>S68 The evaluation's case studies did not find evidence that the FTI was actually diverting resources from other EFA objectives. (In some cases there was direct FTI support to other components of EFA, or broad support to a sector programme that extended beyond primary.) However, there is a case that other EFA goals (such as adult literacy) have tended to be neglected by governments and donors alike, and that the FTI has not challenged this. A narrow focus on primary education may be less appropriate in the context of fragile states (where secondary education and adult learning may have an important role in addressing causes of fragility). And the more success there is in expanding primary education, the greater the pressure on other levels of the education system (as manifested in the increased political attention to secondary education in several of the case study countries). However, discussions within the FTI about expanding its scope have not adequately addressed the resource implications of doing so.</p>	<p>The specific examples where FTI support has clearly extended beyond UPC are highlighted in SR Chapter 3, ¶3.105 and 3.113 and spelt out fully in the case studies for the countries concerned. Conclusions on this topic are in Chapter 4, ¶4.16–4.18.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country case studies; FTI and CF documentation; interviews; literature review.</i></p>
<p>High Level Questions 3: Has the FTI helped mobilize domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies based on Paris Declaration ideals?</p>	<p>The evaluation found that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FTI has helped mobilise resources but the main drivers have been outside the FTI; domestic resource mobilisation (in several though not all endorsed countries) has been the main source of funding; • On international resource mobilisation: the FTI has had less overall effect than intended; there has been an influence on the pattern of mobilisation with the CF becoming much more significant in recent years. • Paris Declaration (PD) ideals have been supported at global level and in FTI design; but the country studies indicate a disconnect between HQ commitment to PD and in-country realisation of PD (described in SR Chapter 4 as the resilience of "business as usual"). <p>These points are elaborated against the subquestions below.</p>	<p>Synthesis Report Chapter 3C (resource mobilisation) and Chapter 3G (aid effectiveness); Appendix II(education finance in general) and III (the catalytic fund). (Plus country-level case studies.)</p> <p><i>Evidence base: analysis of global aid and public finance data (drawing on UIS, FTIS, PDD, OECD DAC CRS); country studies, Hewlett/ODI study (Steer & Wathne 2009), SBSiP study (Mokoro and ODI 2009), Paris Declaration surveys etc; Interviews.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>How can FTI best help mobilize resources and improve aid effectiveness going forward?</p>	<p>SR Chapter 5 provides recommendations for the comprehensive reform of the FTI, in which improved resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness would be central. Additional detail on the role of the Catalytic Fund in a reformed FTI is provided in Appendix VII. The recommendations on accountability and M&E (elaborated in Appendix VI) are crucial for ensuring a robust link between objectives and implementation.</p>	<p>Synthesis Report - Chapter 5 Annex VII (Reforming the Catalytic Fund) <i>Evidence base: recommendations draw on the substantive findings of the evaluation, together with considerations of good practice in this and other sectors.</i></p>
<p>a. Has FTI helped them to improve interagency cooperation and harmonization?</p>	<p>The evaluation found that at global level the FTI has been a significant force for better cooperation and harmonisation amongst aid agencies supporting basic education. It has been an important, inclusive global forum, especially for donors; it has played an important role in keeping UPC and EFA on the international agenda, and, not least, it has reinforced the focus of education donors on supporting county-owned plans and processes. It has also been a prominent advocate of the Paris Declaration agenda including improved cooperation and harmonisation.</p> <p>However, the evaluation also found that the FTI's aid effectiveness agenda has not been strongly delivered in practice. As noted in the SR:</p> <p>S49 In spite of the FTI's global advocacy of the Paris Declaration principles and some country-level gains, delivery of the aid effectiveness agenda at country level has been disappointing. Poor communication of the FTI's aid effectiveness aspirations (both by the Secretariat and by donor headquarters) has meant that the FTI's aid effectiveness agenda is not understood at country level as well as it should be. In many cases the FTI is seen too narrowly in terms of opportunities for funding from the CF, while in turn the CF is often perceived as a financing window of the WB.</p> <p>At country level, there has been a positive influence of joint appraisal processes in many countries to strengthen donor coordination. Nevertheless, the record of substantive improvements is patchy: weak communication and understanding of FTI aid effectiveness objectives and processes have led to misunderstanding and high transactions costs. FTI processes have focused more on initial endorsement than subsequent implementation of ESPs, and have increasingly focused more narrowly on CF operations.</p> <p>(The second part of SR Chapter 4 focuses on the reasons for these shortcomings, especially in terms of the various incentives to which stakeholders respond.)</p>	<p>Synthesis Report Chapter 3G; Chapters 2 and 4; Annex B (Governance). Country case studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country studies, Hewlett/ODI study (Steer & Wathne 2009), SBSiP study (Mokoro and ODI 2009),. Paris Declaration surveys ETC, Interviews.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>b. To what extent are FTI partners improving the alignment of their development assistance to country-owned plans?</p>	<p>The evaluation notes that the FTI did help to make the country-owned ESP a principal focus of aid agencies' attention:</p> <p>S31 <i>The FTI has reinforced the focus of education donors on supporting country-owned plans and processes.</i> In doing so, it has built on and complemented existing trends towards sector approaches and more systematic planning to achieve such goals as EFA and the MDGs. Efforts to make FTI guidelines more comprehensive reflect donor collaboration at global level to align their approaches. The value of performing policy simulations and checking their fiscal realism has been recognised, as has the importance of many of the policy issues highlighted by the Indicative Framework.</p> <p>However:</p> <p>S61 Implementation at country level has been very variable. In a number of countries the FTI's intervention has focused strongly on the endorsement process and been very weak after this. Changing rules and unclear processes (and hence unclear communication from the FTI Secretariat), have led to confusion and high transaction costs. ... Country implementation has also been affected by the lack of monitoring, leaving the FTI with insufficient information to adjust its actions.</p> <p>Alignment of development assistance to country-owned plans has not been well monitored (cf. ongoing discussions about the possibility of certifying [components of] donors' aid to basic education as Paris-compliant and thus part of the overall contribution to the FTI, as cited in Appendix VII).</p> <p>Limiting factors on alignment with country systems have included the restrictions on aid modalities linked to IDA regulations and weak links between education sector processes to macroeconomic planning and finance (both in country and within donor organisations).</p>	<p>See SR Chapter 3G (aid effectiveness) and 3C (finance). At global level, Annex B (Governance) provides additional analysis of the dynamics of donor relationships.</p> <p>See also the country case studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country studies, Interviews, document review, Hewlett/ODI study ((Steer & Wathne 2009), analysis of CF and other funding flows.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>c. Has FTI contributed to the reduction in transaction costs, both for partner countries and partner agencies?</p>	<p>Reducing transaction costs was identified as one of the FTI's main principles, but the evaluation finds that it has not simplified things as much as could have been expected:</p> <p>S50 A lack of clarity about FTI procedures (partly reflecting its hurried start and continual adjustments) has resulted in high transaction costs. In a number of countries with existing ESPs, parallel plans were developed for the FTI and misunderstandings about the IF meant extra work. Adopting the most aligned aid modality has often been difficult because of the WB's limited flexibility and a heavy reliance on the WB as the supervising entity in FTI countries.</p> <p><u>Concerning endorsement:</u> This was often seen in country case studies as a heavy process involving high transaction costs, both for partner countries and partner agencies.</p> <p><u>Concerning the Catalytic Fund:</u> To the extent that the CF acts an international pooled fund, it can reduce the number of countries a donor deals with, and vice versa. This effect may strengthen as the number of substantial donors to the CF increases.</p> <p>In practice the CF has had a positive effect in a small number of cases. There have also been negative effects through requesting specific derogations from existing processes – largely an effect of the change of WB trust fund management procedures.</p> <p>Slow disbursements have caused significant damage to the FTI's reputation.</p> <p>Overall management of CF resources is seen as a heavy process which is one of the reasons why local donors often do not wish to act as alternative supervising entities.</p>	<p><i>SR Chapter 3G; country case studies; Appendix III on the Catalytic Fund.</i></p> <p><i>Evidence base: country studies, SBSiP study, Paris Declaration surveys, Interviews, review of CF fund and other FTI documentation.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>d. To what extent have partner countries and agencies been using innovative and flexible means of financial support and to what extent do those means of support demonstrably improve aid effectiveness?</p>	<p>The evaluation finds that overall the progress towards the adoption of programme based approaches in the education sector has been slow.</p> <p>Traditional investment projects with relatively short time-horizons are dominant in CF-funded programmes – partly reflecting the limits of available WB aid modalities.</p> <p>However, there are some positive elements to highlight:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • there has been some stimulus to pooling of funds (including the CF as a global pooled fund); • use of SBS for the first time through a DPO in Burkina Faso and Rwanda expected in 2009; • examples of support to school level funding (including Kenya, Rwanda). <p>With regard to the effectiveness of these aid modalities, several studies (see in particular Exhibit 13 in the main volume) point towards the advantages of using country systems, including the potential effectiveness of SBS to reduce transaction costs, improve alignment and enhance ownership and accountability, and enhance the expansion of service delivery.</p>	<p>See Chapter 3C and 3G. Appendix III on the Catalytic Fund. The aid modalities used in the case study countries are mapped in Exhibit 16 of the SR. Annex B includes an explanation of the constraints on the World Bank. Country case studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: analysis of global aid data (OECD DAC CRS); country studies, Hewlett/ODI study (Steer & Wathne 2009), SBSiP study (Mokoro and ODI 2009), Paris Declaration surveys, interviews.</i></p>
<p>e. Has FTI been influential in mobilizing increased funding levels and non-financial resources for education among partner countries and agencies?</p>	<p>For the first part of the question (funding levels) – see sub-question 3g below.</p> <p>Regarding non financial resources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Capacity development</u>: FTI endorsement has often required (although not a formal requirement) the country to carry out a CSR and develop a policy simulation model, which have proved in general useful tools to enhance country planning processes. Nevertheless, the appraisal and endorsement by the FTI have in general not led to significant additional CD support from donors. • <u>Data and M&E</u>: analysis shows that the FTI has not influenced significantly the level of attention to the data gap and M&E. It has relied on other channels of donor support, but has not contributed significantly to making it more efficient and effective. <p>In general, there is a problem of a hollowing out of donor agency education skills, both centrally and in-country. This can make it harder to deliver appropriate and timely non-funding resources</p>	<p>See Chapter 3D (policy and planning); Chapter 3E (capacity development) and Chapter 3F (data and M&E). These are supported by Annex F (data and M&E, which includes an overview of CSRs), and Annex G on capacity development and by the country studies.</p> <p>On related issue of donor agency education skills, see Chapter 3D (including the discussion around Box 5, which draws in evidence from Steer & Wathne 2009, and Box 6 which draws on this evaluation's case studies).</p> <p><i>Evidence base: country studies, interviews, documents and literature review, Hewlett/ODI study (Steer & Wathne 2009).</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>f. To what extent has FTI assisted countries in closing their financing gaps for their EFA acceleration efforts? Has this been in the context of sustainable fiscal policy?</p>	<p>The "financing gap" has been an ubiquitous term in the discourse around the FTI. However, the evaluation identifies serious conceptual problems in the definition, calculation and use of the "financing gap" concept by the FTI partnership in general, by the CF Committee and at country level. The findings are spelt out in Annex K, and summarised thus in the SR:</p> <p>The evaluation finds that the FTI's design has in practice:</p> <p>Applied the concepts of the four "gaps" too simplistically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The "financing gap" is a problematic concept and has been used inconsistently. It has become a matter of negotiation, and has sometimes distorted the realism of country plans. Its use in influencing CF allocations has lacked coherence and transparency. (SR¶57(d)) <p>Caveats about the "financing gap" terminology need to be borne in mind in relation to the evaluation's substantive findings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The global financing gap for reaching EFA goals does not appear to be closing. The FTI financing strategy of catalysing additional bilateral and multilateral funds for basic education at country level does not appear to have worked and CFs have not been delivered to countries on anything like the scale required to compensate for this. • In some countries, CF funding has provided a major increase in education financing, but without the assurance of long term predictability. • There is prima facie evidence (from country level and from interviews) that CF allocations may be displacing other donor financing for basic/primary education. • FTI support (whether via the CF or through parallel donor funding) falls short of providing the long-term predictable funding that was envisaged when the FTI was designed; this limits its ability to contribute towards sustainable domestic fiscal policies (cf. the second part of subquestion 3g below). 	<p>See SR Annex K, Chapter 3C, Chapter 3G, Appendices II and III, and the country case studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: analysis of global aid and public finance data (UIS, FTIS, PDD, OECD DAC CRS); country studies, Interviews</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>g. Has FTI succeeded in mobilizing additional resources in support of EFA? To what extent have any increases come from domestic financing? From international assistance?</p>	<p>Both globally and in the country case studies, the evaluation's approach was to assess overall trends in financing for EFA, and then seek to identify the FTI contribution. There are limitations in the data available, both as regards aid flows and in relation to domestic financing. These are carefully noted. A further limitation is that the FTI-related financing commitments at country level that were anticipated in the FTI design – as crystallised in the FTI Framework (FTI 2004) – were never systematically registered or monitored. The evaluation concludes that:</p> <p><i>With respect to resource mobilisation, the results have been disappointing, globally and in most countries.</i></p> <p>S35 The FTI identified finance as one of the key constraints to accelerating UPC. It specifically set out to promote: (a) sustained increases in aid for primary education; (b) more efficient aid for primary education; and (c) adequate and sustainable domestic financing for education.</p> <p>S36 Aid commitments to education generally and to basic education in particular increased significantly between 1999 and 2004, but there has been little growth in either since then. By 2007, aid commitments to basic education were 25% lower than at their peak in 2004. The global evidence therefore does not indicate that the FTI has had the large positive effect on the level of external financing for education or basic education that was envisaged at its inception.</p> <p>S37 With some exceptions, there has been significant real growth in current expenditure on education and basic education from domestic sources. Nevertheless, in most cases the influence of the FTI on this trend was judged by the evaluation to be marginal. Government commitment to primary education was already evident in the pre-endorsement period, and other major drivers have played a more significant role, such as economic growth, the move to sector-wide approaches (SWAs), debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, a strong increase in general budget support (GBS) levels, and/or political changes which put more emphasis on primary education.</p> <p>S38 Two key elements in the FTI's resource mobilisation strategy appear from the country case studies not to have met their intended objectives. Firstly, the use of the financing gap as an aid mobilisation tool and as a basis to decide upon CF allocations has been problematic: financing gaps have not been calculated in consistent or objective ways, and CF allocation criteria have not been consistent or strategic in their application. Secondly, the catalytic effect of endorsement has not met expectations in terms of scale or sustainability, mainly due to lack of understanding of the key drivers of donor allocations, weak communication between global and local level, and a lack of monitoring.</p> <p>S39 Various factors were found to have limited the influence of the FTI processes on domestic budget allocations. These included a lack of engagement with Ministries of Finance and national Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) processes, and the choice of projects or pooled funds as aid modalities. There are some notable exceptions where the FTI has had a positive influence on domestic budget allocations, in particular when the CF has been provided through sector budget support and Ministries of Finance have been actively involved.</p>	<p>SR Chapter 3C, Appendix II. Country studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: analysis of global aid and public finance data (UIS, FTIS, PDD, OECD DAC CRS); country studies.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>In countries where domestic financing in support of EFA has increased what are the prospects for sustaining those levels of funding?</p>	<p>As regards domestic expenditure, comprehensive data from all low income countries are not available, but evidence from more than 30 African countries suggests that GDP growth largely explains the real growth in domestically financed expenditure on education which has occurred in many of these countries. Accordingly, these gains are vulnerable to the economic downturn now under way. (SR, ¶3.29)</p> <p>Most case studies highlight the strong government commitment to increased domestic financing for primary education. They also stress that major threats to the sustainability of this increase come from the evolving macro-economic and trade situation, potential political tensions (Ethiopia, Yemen, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Zambia), and increasing expenditure on secondary education (Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Ethiopia) or tertiary education (Ghana). (SR ¶3.37)</p>	<p>Chapter 3C (mobilising resources), Appendix II (education finance). (Detailed data tables in Appendix I, along with discussion of limitations in available data.) Country studies.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: analysis of global aid data (OECD DAC CRS, Pôle de Dakar especially useful); country studies, interviews.</i></p>
<p>h. Has FTI's own governance and management made a difference in how efficiently the Initiative works in furthering EFA goals? Namely, can the FTI governance bodies be considered legitimate? Are FTI decision-making processes open, transparent, inclusive and well founded?</p>	<p>The evaluation acknowledges the inherent difficulties of managing a global partnership such as the FTI, and takes note of the strengths and weaknesses of the FTI's governance and management. It concludes that the FTI shows shortcomings against each of the subquestions posed here, and makes systematic recommendations for addressing these shortcomings. Thus:</p> <p>On the positive side:</p> <p>S52 In the area of governance in particular, the FTI has shown willingness and commitment to reform. Progress has been made in strengthening the FTI's governance both at global and country levels. Many (though not all) of the issues highlighted in the first external review of the FTI in 2005 have been reflected in subsequent governance changes. The FTI today includes better representation of its various constituencies in decision-making, its governance structures have been streamlined, the dominant role of the WB has been somewhat modified, and country processes have been clarified.</p> <p>At the same time:</p> <p>S62 In spite of the positive commitment to reform noted above, governance reform has been inordinately time-consuming, underscoring the lack of efficiency in governance processes, and some key issues are yet to be adequately addressed. Decisions have been taken in an ad hoc fashion without adequate consideration of their strategic implications and implementation requirements (the series of decisions to broaden the scope of the partnership and the role of the Catalytic Fund are the most obvious examples).</p> <p>S63 At the level of management, the concept of a "light touch" and of a "lean" secretariat was never reconciled with the extensive roles the Secretariat was required to perform if the FTI was to carry through effectively the design that was embodied in the FTI Framework. The country studies document the inefficiency and poor communications that have resulted. As a consequence, the FTI's decision-making procedures and criteria have often been opaque,</p>	<p>See SR Chapter 2 (and for more detail, Annex B). ¶2.51–2.53 give an overview of changes and adaptations and of issues still outstanding. See SR Chapter 4.20–4.24 for the summary assessment of the FTI's governance strengths and weaknesses. See Annex F for more on M&E aspects.</p> <p>On the operation of the FTI Trust Funds, see Appendix III (CF), Appendix IV (EPDF) and – for recommendations on future trust fund management, Appendix VII. Annex K documents inconsistency and lack of transparency in the operation of the Catalytic Fund.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: FTI and related documentation; country studies, interviews; review of EPDF and CF operations; observation of FTI meetings, comparison with other global programmes..</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
	<p>undermining its principle of transparency as well as its credibility.</p> <p>Unresolved governance issues include(SR ¶2.53):</p> <p>(c) Resolving the conflicts of interest which arises out of the multiple roles of the World Bank within the FTI (as trustee, supervising entity, partner in the LDG/LEG, provider of technical services, host of the secretariat, and its EPDF related roles). These have been only partially addressed through the reforms so far. The multiple roles of the WB have affected the balance in the partnership by giving one partner a much more prominent role. It has led to the FTI being identified at country level (and to a lesser extent at global level) as a WB programme. Conflicts of interest have been a serious constraint on the Secretariat's ability to serve the interests of the partnership as a whole.</p> <p>(d) In spite of improved representation, the FTI still has less inclusive mechanisms than some other global partnerships, and broader representation does not extend to some of the key decision-making bodies of the FTI – in particular the Trust Fund committees where only donors who contribute to the funds are represented. Thus, in terms of its financial decisions, the FTI continues to be donor dominated. Some key procedures in the FTI process – such as the presentation of country proposals by the lead donor rather than the country government – continue to reinforce this.</p> <p>(e) Transparency of criteria and of decision-making by the Trust Funds continues to be an issue, with different standards being applied to different countries/proposals (this is fully documented in Annex K).</p> <p>Thus:</p> <p>S59 The FTI has been (and despite some modifications still is) an unbalanced partnership. Although described from the outset as a partnership and a compact, it was a donor initiative, with very little involvement of partner countries in its design, and it has remained more a donor collaboration than a genuine partnership. Partner countries, in particular, still have a very limited role and are not involved in financial decisions.</p> <p>and (SR ¶4.12b):</p> <p>Apart from inefficiency and poor communications that have resulted (as documented in the country studies), the governance and management weaknesses have compromised the FTI principle of transparency – its decision making procedures and criteria have often been opaque.</p> <p>Weaknesses in M&E (next question below) have been a key deficiency in the FTI's governance.</p>	

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>Does the Initiative have an adequate monitoring and evaluation framework, and is it creating regular, useful inputs to decision making?</p>	<p>No. As the SR notes: <i>In monitoring and feedback</i> S64 The FTI did not establish a proper results-oriented M&E framework at the outset, and so it has not been able adequately to monitor country and global level processes. Basic management monitoring systems were not set up to establish whether the FTI was achieving the inputs, let alone the outputs, that its "business plan" required. The FTI has blurred the distinction between objective monitoring and advocacy. Weaknesses in monitoring have prevented the FTI from recognising key differences between FTI aspirations and the reality (particularly the gap between its aspirations as a global partnership and the reality of country-level implementation).</p> <p>Hence M&E features at the core of the evaluation's recommendations: <i>Monitoring and evaluation</i> S80 A crucial part of the redesign of the FTI must be to devise a framework, agreed to and owned by all partners, for monitoring and evaluating the FTI's own activities. This must involve a clear understanding about the making and monitoring of commitments by all partners (the "compact"), at both country and global level.</p>	<p>The main analyses of M&E are in Chapter 3F of the SR and Annex F. Appendix VI provides detailed recommendations for developing a proper M&E framework in future (and also for addressing future impact evaluation).</p> <p>These are supported by two working papers prepared by the evaluation: White 2009 and Carr-Hill 2009.</p> <p>M&E associated with the CF and the EPDF are reviewed in Appendix III and Appendix IV respectively.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: The evidence base includes the review of all relevant FTI documentation, interviews with participants and stakeholders, observation of FTI meetings, comparison with other global partnerships. M&E was reviewed in all the country case studies.</i></p>

Terms of Reference Question	Response	Where covered? Evidence Base?
<p>Are FTI processes (endorsement, processing of catalytic funds requests, triggering the flow of funds) consistent across countries, timely and efficient (for example, how much time does it take between FTI endorsement and the flow of FTI-triggered funding at the country level)?</p>	<p>FTI processes have changed and developed over time. The FTI has made efforts to address issues and problems as they were identified (e.g. whether endorsement would relate to a country-specific plan; the problems that arose from changes in WB rules for managing trust funds). The country level process guidelines (FTI 2009) and the aid modality guidelines (FTI 2008) represent efforts to clarify and streamline procedures. Nevertheless (a) there have been pervasive inconsistencies over the lifetime of the FTI, and (b) further improvements in processes are required if the FTI is to achieve greater consistency and effectiveness in future.</p> <p>Lack of consistency has stemmed both from weak communication channels and from constantly evolving rules and procedures. The evaluation recognises that it is inherently difficult simultaneously to align with country-level plans and processes, and to ensure consistency across countries.</p> <p>Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of consistent approach to endorsement of ESP (SR chapter 3D); <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ lack of clarity as to whether existing or FTI-specific plans should be reviewed for endorsement (SR ¶3.88–3.89); ○ lack of consistency of criteria for deciding whether ESPs are satisfactory (SR ¶3.90, ¶3.98–3.99, ¶3.115–3.116); ○ lack of consistency in treatment of fragile states (SR ¶3.106–3.109 and Annex H). • Lack of consistent approach to financing gap estimates (SR ¶3.31–3.36 and Annex K). • Lack of consistent approach to CF allocations (SR ¶3.46 and Appendix III). • Lack of consistent approach to aid modalities (SR ¶3.206–3.2311 and Exhibit16). • Non-transparency of EPDF (SR ¶3.140 and Appendix IV). <p>Confusion and frustration has been caused by this lack of consistency, as well as by weak communication and lack of clear guidance.</p> <p>Regarding the efficiency of FTI-triggered funding flows, there has been no effective process to ensure that non-CF funds would flow in response to endorsement. In respect of the CF, there have been well-documented issues of slow disbursement, particularly linked to the application of more restrictive IDA rules for trust fund operations. There is a variable picture of disbursement performance across countries but also of improvement over time. Recent amendments in procedures are expected to bring about further improvement (Appendix III, Annex B Section H).</p>	<p>The overall evolution of FTI processes is described in Chapter 2 of the SR, and in more detail in Annex B. Further details are given in relation to each workstream in Chapter 3 of the SR.</p> <p>For CF and EPDF processes see also Appendix III and Appendix IV. (Annex B, Section H provides additional analysis of the WB's trust fund management.)</p> <p>For reasons why processes have functioned sub-optimally, see SR Chapter 4; for recommendations on improved future processes (requiring some radical changes and not just fine tuning) see Chapter 5. For details on future design of the CF from this perspective see Appendix VII.</p> <p><i>Evidence base: Country studies, FTI documentation (including internal and external FTI reviews which themselves identify many of the issues and problems reported by this evaluation), interviews, observation of FTI meetings, analysis of FTI trust funds processes, comparison with other global partnerships.</i></p>

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